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Abstract: This paper assesses whether there is a gender gap in the use of financial services by 
businesses and individuals in Sub-Saharan Africa. We show the existence of an unconditional 
gender gap, as the absolute use of financial services is higher for males than females. However, 
when key observable characteristics of the enterprises or individuals are taken into account the 
gender gap disappears. In the case of enterprises, we explain our finding with differences in 
key characteristics and a poential selection bias – females owned ones are smaller, younger and 
less likely to run sole proprietorships than men, furthermore these are more likely to innovate 
and more prevalent in sectors that tend to rely less on access to external finance.  In the case of 
individuals, the lower use of formal financial services by women can be explained by gender 
gaps in other dimensions related to the use of financial services, such as their lower level of 
income and education, and by their household and employment status. Exploring the reasons 
for not applying or being unbanked shows that traditional bank barriers such as higher interest 
rates, lack of formal income or job are more binding for females than for males. This suggests 
that, conditional on their observable characteristics, females do not have inherently lower 
demand nor that there is taste-based discrimination.  
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1. Introduction 
Access to and use of financial services by both enterprises and households is of 
increasing concern to policy makers across Africa and the developing world. Recent data 
collection efforts on both the enterprise and household levels have enabled a more rigorous 
analysis (World Bank, 2007). One important dimension in the access to finance debate, which 
has been less analyzed, is the gender gap. Specifically, it has often been argued that lack of 
access to finance impedes female entrepreneurship and prevents women from participating in 
the modern market economy. Given the overall lack of financial service provision, with fewer 
than one in five households having access to formal financial services, this problem is 
potentially more pressing in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other developing regions of the 
world (Honohan and Beck, 2007).  
As documented by an extensive and still growing literature, access to credit is 
important for firm growth, especially that of small firms (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2005)1, and for new business creation (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2006).  
Country-specific studies and randomized field experiments confirm that access to capital can 
be critical for firm growth (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008; De Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff, 
2008).  However, credit is not the only financial service that seems to matter.  Recent 
evidence shows that access to savings services can also increase enterprise investment, 
especially among female entrepreneurs (Dupas and Robinson, 2009).  Broad access to 
financial services is not only important for individuals, but also for the economy at large; 
credit constraints reduce the efficiency of capital allocation and intensify income inequality 
by impeding the flow of capital to poor individuals with investment opportunities with high 
expected returns (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Galor and Moav, 2004, 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2007; Lopez and Serven, 2009).  Gender differences in 
                                               
1 Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier and Pagés (2011) find this effect for small firms but not for very small. 
  4
   
 
access to and use of financial services can therefore have direct negative repercussions not 
only for female entrepreneurs and individuals but for the overall economy.  
There are several theoretical reasons explaining a possible gender gap in access to 
financial services.  First, there might be taste discrimination in the sense that the financial 
system is dominated by men and the barriers to accessing financial services are consequently 
higher for women than men, partly due to bank-level barriers, partly due to barriers in 
institutional framework underpinning financial service provision as discussed below. Second, 
there might be statistical discrimination, in the sense that the lower degree of education and 
involvement in the former market economy is a barrier for women to access to formal 
financial services. Third, this lower involvement in the formal market economy might also 
reflect a traditional role distribution in society, with women focused on household activities 
and men focused on market economies, this being reflected in the use of formal financial 
services. Gauging whether such a gender bias exists and the reason for it has important policy 
repercussions.  
A recent global data complication shows the extent to which Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) countries tend to be characterized by a degree of gender discrimination that is different 
from other regions. Figure 1 shows how SSA countries are ranked in terms of gender 
discrimination as measured by the Women, Business and the Law index with respect to other 
countries in the world. This index, developed by the World Bank Group, varies between 0 
and 1 and includes 9 dimensions of equality in Law2 such as ownership rights, inheritance, 
capacity before the law, rights of married men compared to married women, as well as a set 
of work related issues.3 Figure 1 indicates that the Women, Business and the Law index is 
                                               
2 It is constructed by averaging 9 dummy variables that have a value of 1 if there is gender equality in a specific 
area and a 0 if there is not; lower values indicate therefore more pronounced gender discrimination.  
3 Such as tax liability, industry or work hours discrimination, and within these issues, discrimination towards 
women who are pregnant or nursing 
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substantially lower in SSA than in the rest of the world; the average index value in SSA is 
0.5, while for the rest of the world it is 0.85. This suggests that the legal and business 
environment in SSA countries is characterized by a higher degree of gender discrimination. 
Our study takes this fact as starting point and addresses whether there is empirical evidence 
that this SSA de jure inequality translates into a differential in female use of financial 
services.  
This paper analyzes gender differences in access to credit by enterprises and use of 
formal and informal financial services by individuals in SSA. Specifically, we use enterprise 
surveys to assess whether enterprises with female owners in SSA are less likely to rely on 
formal bank finance than enterprises with purely male owners. Additionally, for those that 
have not applied for a loan, we explore differences in the reasons for not applying between 
female and male entrepreneurs.  We also use recent FinScope and FinAccess surveys across 
nine countries in Southern and East Africa to assess gender differences in the use of formal 
and informal financial services by individuals as well as explore gender differences in the 
reasons for being unbanked. We thus carefully distinguish between the access to and the use 
of formal financial services. While firms and individuals with access but no need for financial 
services are of less concern for policy makers, constrained access that translates into a 
reduced use of formal financial services constitutes a challenge.  
  6
   
 
 
This paper relates to a growing literature on the gender gap in access to credit (see 
Klapper and Parker, 2010, for a survey). Cross-country studies have shown that women are 
less likely to get financing from a formal financial institution or are charged higher interest 
rate than men (Muravyev, et al., 2009) and generally raise less formal and informal venture 
capital than men (Brush, et al., 2004). Bruhn (2009), on the other hand, does not find any 
evidence for Latin America for a gender gap in access to credit by enterprises.  Richardson, 
Howarth and Finnegan (2004) find for Sub-Saharan Africa that women entrepreneurs are 
more likely than male entrepreneurs to rely on internal or informal financing. This gender gap 
is also reflected in higher financing obstacles reported by women.  The literature has also 
explored the reasons behind such a gender gap. Buvinic and Berger (1990) find that female 
entrepreneurs struggle more with loan applications, while Lusardi and Tufano (2009) find 
lower overall financial literacy among women.  However, behavioral differences might also 
be important, leading to taste rather than statistical discrimination (Beck, Behr and 
`
Figure 1: Women, Business and Law index across the world. 
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
Sub-Saharan Africa
Other
Sample size: 79 countries
  7
   
 
Madestam, 2011).  Evidence from Africa shows that in many instances, only male heads of 
households are able to successfully receive formal credit (Johnson, 2004). 
Among institutional factors explaining gender differences in access to credit might be 
property right restrictions for women. Such restrictions might include requirements for 
married women to obtain their husband’s signature and approval for all banking transactions.4 
Women can also be affected by a husband’s adverse credit history, which might require his 
wife to repay the debt or be denied credit (Naidoo and Hilton, 2006).  
The observation of a gender gap has led many NGO supported microcredit institutions 
to focus on women rather than men. Given the limitations of microcredit, both in volume and 
in outreach, however, it is important to understand differences in the use of formal banking 
services (Honohan, 2004).  In addition to formal financial services, many individuals and 
enterprises across the developing world use informal financial services, ranging from money 
lenders to informal savings clubs. In our empirical work, we will therefore also consider the 
use of informal financial services by households.  
The empirical findings of the enterprise analyses confirm that firms with female 
ownership participation are unconditionally less likely to use formal bank credit than firms 
with male ownership, however this gap disappears when controlling for observables firm’ 
characteristics (i.e. industry, size, ownership type, age, export orientation, foreign ownership, 
location). Further, we show that females owned businesses are unconditionally more likely to 
be rejected when applying for a loan but not more likely to be discouraged from applying 
than males owned ones. Having found evidence of an unconditional gender gap we analyze 
the extent to which observables characteristics do explain these results.  In addition, we argue 
that the results about the lack of gender difference in access to finance, conditional on 
                                               
4 See “Empowering Women. Legal Rights and Economic Opportunities in Africa” (Hallward-Driemeier and 
Hasan, 2013`) for more detailed information and broader coverage of countries in SSA. 
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controlling for firm characteristics, can be actually explained by the existence of a selection 
process. Our regression analysis suggests that size, age and a lower likelihood to be an 
exporter and have foreign participation, explain why, prima facie, women owned companies 
tend to be less likely to have access to finance. Furthermore, we point to four additional 
important findings.  First, female entrepreneurs are less likely to own sole proprietorships 
than men and face higher regulatory burden than men, especially in Africa. Second, 
enterprises with female ownership are smaller, younger, less likely to be engaged in export 
activities and have foreign participation, accordingly tend have less access to the financial 
markets, and women are less likely to be entrepreneurs. Third, female owned enterprises are 
more likely to innovate what could be explained by the fact that female entrepreneurs need to 
be especially capable in order to be able to enter the formal sector and in fact have 
characteristics that make them more attractive for financial institutions. Fourth, we find some 
limited support for the hypothesis of a “sectoral selection” as female ownership tend to be 
more prevalent in sectors that, on average across countries, tend to rely less on access to 
external finance.  
Similarly, the household analysis shows that while unconditional comparisons present 
a lower use of formal banking services by women, there is no significant gender difference 
once we control for other individual characteristics, including education, income, work status, 
geographic location, and education.  While gender differences in the use of informal financial 
services vary across countries, women are not more or less likely to be excluded from any 
financial service than men, at least in our sample of nine countries.  Lower income and 
education, a lower likelihood to be formally employed and their role within the household 
explain why, prima facie, women are less likely to use formal financial services. These 
barriers that women face as individuals to access formal financial services might also explain 
the selection bias among female entrepreneurs mentioned above, though we cannot formally 
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test for it. On the other hand, we find that women in several countries are more likely to use 
informal financial services. Considering gender differences in the reasons for being 
unbanked, we find that females are more likely to report the lack of income or a formal job as 
reasons for not being banked, while males are more likely to state the lack of need or bank-
related reasons, such as geographic distance or high minimum balances and fees), consistent 
with the hypothesis that women are disadvantaged along other dimensions correlated with the 
use of formal financial services.  
Our paper contributes to the literature on access to finance along several dimensions. 
First, while most studies so far have been limited to one country, this is a cross-country 
exploration of gender differences in access to and use of financial services for both 
enterprises and households.5 Second, this paper considers access to and use of all financial 
services, not just credit as done in large parts of the literature. In addition, it also looks 
beyond formal financial services to informal financial services. Third, this paper contributes 
to the literature on gender differences in Sub-Saharan Africa. As rigorous analysis for SSA is 
often impeded by the lack of appropriate data, the data compilations used in this paper offer a 
unique opportunity to explore gender differences in the participation in formal and informal 
economies in SSA.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section focuses on the 
gender gap in enterprise finance using a large cross-section of firm-level surveys. Section 3 
presents results on the gender gap in the use of financial services by individuals and section 4 
concludes.  
 
2. Gender and Enterprise Use of Formal Finance 
                                               
5 See World Bank (2007) for an overview of studies on access to finance. 
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This section assesses whether there is a gender gap in enterprises’ use of formal 
finance.  Specifically, using firm-level survey data, we analyze whether businesses with 
female ownership participation are less likely to use a formal financing channel (e.g. loan or 
overdraft) and whether there are gender differences in the reasons for not using formal 
finance. Differences in the use of formal financial services between male and female-owned 
enterprises would suggest potentially tougher financial conditions for women’s enterprises, 
though not necessarily imply a causal relationship, as female enterprises may opt for less 
aggressive operations requiring less finance. On the other hand, if the analysis does not find a 
gender gap between male and female enterprises, we can interpret this as suggesting that 
there is no gender discrimination. 
 
2.1.  Data  
To explore the relationship between gender and enterprise use of formal finance, we 
use the World Bank-IFC Enterprise Surveys. The Enterprise Surveys have been conducted 
over the past eight years in over 100 countries with a consistent survey instrument.6 The 
surveys try to capture business perceptions on the most important obstacles to enterprise 
operation and growth, but also include detailed information on management and financing 
arrangements of companies.    Data are collected using either simple random or random 
stratified sampling.  The sample includes formal and informal SSA enterprises of all sizes, 
different ownership types and across nine sectors in manufacturing, construction, services 
and transportation.  Firms from different locations, such as capital city, major cities and small 
towns, are included. Our sample includes 37 African countries covering in total 11,382 
                                               
6 See www.enterpriseseurveys.org for more details. Similar surveys were previously conducted under the 
leadership of the World Bank and other IFIs in Africa (RPED), and world-wide in 2000 (World Business 
Environment Survey).  Enterprise Surveys still go under different names in some regions, e.g. BEEPS in the 
Central Asia and Eastern European transition economies had first been launched in 1999 and was then modified 
to be comparable with the broader global initiative. 
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formal firms during 2005 to 2009 (Appendix Table A1).  In addition, we focus on 2,406 
informal enterprises, mostly micro-firms for a sample of 25 African countries. While we have 
information on the gender of owners for all firms in our sample, we have gender information 
on the manager for a subsample of 2,428 formal firms across 16 countries. 
The Enterprise Surveys offer several advantages for our purpose. First, the surveys 
collect comparable information for several firm characteristics across all the countries. This 
comparability allows us to document cross-country and within-country variation in the 
profiles of firms that have female ownership participation. Second, the surveys collect 
information on financing at the firm level as well as several other relevant firm 
characteristics. These include the firm size and age, measures of technology adoption, firms’ 
international openness, i.e. export activity, and sources of capital. In addition, there is also 
detailed information on the firm’s geographical location and its sector of activity (3-digit-
ISIC classification).  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. We use 
four different variables to measure firms’ use of formal banking services. Specifically, we use 
two dummy variables indicating whether (i) a firm has an overdraft or loan and (ii) whether a 
firm has a bank account or credit line7. We find that 31 percent have an overdraft or loan and 
77 percent have a bank account or credit line, on average 
The Enterprise Surveys also provide information on owners’ gender. Specifically, we 
have information whether one of the principal owners is a woman. Our main variable, 
‘female participation in ownership’ defines a wide circle of firms as ‘female’, however and 
                                               
7 Additionally we also use information on firms’ financing patterns: the share of their fixed asset investment 
financed through formal commercial institutions and the share of their working capital needs covered with bank 
finance. In robustness tests, we also evaluate gender differences in the use of informal finance using the share of 
their fixed asset investment and the share of their working capital needs financed through informal financial 
sources. 
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thus may lead to lower bound estimates on the extent to which gender may matter.8  To 
address this issue, we will present results for the whole sample as well as for the subsample 
of sole proprietorships, as this allows us to isolate enterprises that are completely run by a 
female owner.  Looking at sole proprietors does address the ownership-decision maker 
distinction, but the average size of the firm is smaller. We will also use the variable ‘female 
manager’ that identifies female-run firms, although the sample is smaller. Our sample has 24 
percent of formal firms with at least one female owner and 13 percent (in a smaller 
subsample) have a female manager. There are significant differences between formal and 
informal enterprises in terms of gender gap in ownership.  Specifically, 30 percent of 
companies have female ownership participation in the case of informal firms. 
In addition to presenting unconditional results, we also focus on results where we 
control for several firm characteristics, described in Table 1, including size, legal status, 
exporter status, location, age and ownership. 19 percent of formal firms across the sample 
have five or fewer employees, 52 percent of formal enterprises are sole proprietorships, eight 
percent of firms export at least 10 percent of their sales and 16 percent have foreign owners 
holding at least 10 percent of capital. In terms of location, 20 percent are located in the 
capital or cities with populations of one million or more. The average age of firms is 13.7 
years.  
 
 
2.2. Multivariate Regression Results  
We start from estimating the following regression where our outcome variable of 
interest is measured at the level of the firm i in country c belonging to sector s at time t.  
                                               
8 Aterido and Hallward-Driemeier (2011) show that up to half of the firms that have multiple owners of which at 
least one is female, do not have women among their prime decision makers. 
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 !"#$% = '( + '*+,-"#%+'./-01"#$% + 23#% + 45$ + 	7"#$%      (1)     
 
where y is a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm has access to a formal financing 
channel (e.g. overdraft or loan), Fem is a dummy variable indicating female ownership 
participation, Empl is the log of the number of employees, an indicator of enterprise size ,M 
are survey-fixed effects9 in order to control for potential shocks or measurement errors across 
different country-years where the surveys are done, and I are industry fixed effects to control 
for demand-side differences in external financing. We include survey-fixed effect as we 
expect that countries with more developed financial institutions may be more likely to have 
services tailored to reach out to more women’s enterprises. Our focus is therefore on an 
unconditional “gender gap” within-country rather than across countries. Regression (1) is 
estimated with a probit but the reported coefficients are the probit marginal effects.10 Our 
results should not be interpreted in a causal manner but rather as unconditional correlations 
exploiting within-country variation between females versus males owned businesses.  
The results in Table 2 provide some initial evidence about the existence of an 
unconditional negative gender gap. First, in column 1 we include all formal companies in our 
sample and find evidence of a negative gender gap even if this statistically non-significant. 
Respectively adding, in column 2 and 3, industry or size controls reduces and eliminates the 
presence of this gap pointing towards the importance of these two channels as key drivers of 
the gender gap: selection into specific sectors and size. However, female ownership 
participation may identify the fact that a woman is one of the many owners, and possibly 
includes cases when her ownership share is irrelevant. For this reason, in columns 4-6 we 
only include companies with a single owner, which confirms the previous results providing 
                                               
9 Each survey is implemented in a specific country and year. 
10 We do estimate a Dprobit as clarified in each table’s notes.  
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some additional evidence about the existence of a gender gap to access finance. In this case, 
the evidence of the unconditional gender gap is statistically significant, and, as before, it is 
weakened by the inclusion of industry or size controls (respectively in columns 5 and 6). 
Finally, in column 7-9 we focus on a smaller subset of countries for which we can identify 
not only the gender of the owner but also the gender of the manager. Here the results are 
substantially stronger and clearly confirm the existence of an unconditional negative gender 
gap. As before, this gender gap is weakened by the inclusion of industry or size controls but, 
differently from the previous regressions, remains statistically significant despite these 
controls.  In sum, the results presented in Table 2 provide evidence towards the existence of 
an unconditional gender gap to access finance; they even suggest the importance of size as a 
key channel explaining an important part of this gap and the selection of female owned, or 
managed, businesses into specific sector as an additional characteristic explaining it.  
Having presented these “unconditional regressions” we now turn to a model where we 
include a larger set of firm-level controls and estimate the following regression   
 !"#$% = '( + '*+,-"#$%+'./-01"#$% + '8/-01"#$% ∗ +,-"#$% + 45$ + 23#% + :"#$%; + 	7"#$%      (2)     
 
 where in addition to the variables included before we also include an array of firm 
characteristics (X) such as the age of the company, a dummy variable identifying location in a 
large city11, a dummy variable identifying exporters and a dummy variable identifying 
foreign ownership. All models are estimated with probit but, as before, the reported 
coefficients are the probit marginal effects.  
The flexible specification in regression (2) allows us to analyze whether enterprises 
with female ownership participation are more financially constrained than other companies 
                                               
11 Defined as capital cities or with population of one million or more. 
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(coefficient b1) and whether these effects are different for firms of different sizes (coefficient 
b3).  Once more, it is important to stress that results should not be interpreted in a causal 
manner as they only present conditional correlations. Specifically, there may be differences in 
the operations of female-owned firms that affect their financing patterns, which are 
observable to both firm and financial institution but not to the researcher.  
Table 3 reports the estimates for regression (2), with the specifications across different 
columns differing in the controls included. In column (1) we include just the Fem dummy 
variable and firm size variable Empl, in addition to controlling for industry and survey 
(country and year) dummies, in column (2) we also add a set of dummies for ownership type 
–omitting public-owned firms, in column (3) we add the interaction Empl*Fem, and in 
column (4) we add a set of firm characteristics such as the log of age, dummy variables for 
whether firm exports and whether it has foreign owned capital, and whether the firm is 
located in the capital or large city. Columns (5) and (6) repeat the exercise for informal firms 
– although reducing the number of controls due to little variation of these variables among 
informal firms.12 
The results in Table 3 show that, on average, conditional on firm’s characteristics there is 
no statistically significant relationship between female ownership and use of formal finance. 
The dummy variable indicating female ownership participation does not enter significantly in 
any of the regressions. Not surprisingly, larger enterprises are more likely to have access to 
external finance, consistent with Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2008). There is no 
significant size effect for female enterprises as shown by the interaction term between the 
female dummy and employment. Sole proprietors are less likely to use formal finance than 
public or privately-owned firms, even controlling for size. We also find, consistent with other 
                                               
12 82 percent of informal enterprises are sole-proprietors, two percent are exporters, and nine percent are foreign 
owned. 
  16
   
 
studies, that older firms, exporters, and firms with foreign ownership are more likely to 
access finance. As shown in columns (5) and (6), these results hold also for the informal 
firms, as there is no significant difference in use of finance by gender and there are no gender 
differences in the relationship between use of finance and firm size. We note, however, that 
the Pseudo R-squared are significantly lower for the regressions of informal enterprises, 
suggesting a much lower fit of the overall model. 
The results in Table 4, once again displaying the probit marginal effects, confirm the 
robustness of the previous results in a subsample of formal and informal sole proprietors. 
Focusing on sole proprietors allows us to isolate enterprises that are 100 percent owned by a 
female. In addition, in a subsample of 16 countries with information available, we also test 
whether the results remain when we specifically identify whether the enterprise is managed 
by a woman or a man. Consistently with previous results, the marginal effect of the female 
variable remains insignificant, once we have conditioned for key firm characteristics. 
Similarly as before, firm size is positively associated with use of formal finance and this 
effect is the same for both companies with and without female owners. Furthermore, if we 
focus on the variable identifying the gender of the manager rather than female participation in 
ownership - columns (5) and (6) - the results again show no gender gap in the use of formal 
finance once we condition for firms characteristics. We also find that formal sole proprietors 
use more financial services if they are in smaller cities, are exporters and older. The Pseudo 
R-squared provide mixed evidence on the fit of the models, which are especially low for the 
regressions using data on the manager gender13.  
                                               
13 Results not reported (available upon request) show the robustness of the findings to the use of alternative 
measures of the use of formal finance. Concretely, use of formal finance is measured by whether the firm has a 
bank account or credit line, the percentage of investments financed externally, and the percentage of working 
capital financed externally. We also measure gender differences in the use of informal financial sources. The 
results confirm that, on average, once we control for key firm’s characteristics there is no statistically significant 
difference between businesses with and without female ownership participation regardless of how use of formal 
finance is measured. 
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In Table 5, we use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, a standard tool for measuring 
contributions of endowments and coefficients in explaining gaps such as those between male 
and females (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973).  Since we have a non-linear model, we use the 
method suggested by Fairlie (2006) for the decomposition.  It computes the difference in the 
probability of access to finance between female and male, quantifying the contribution of 
group differences in the independent variables and estimating the separate contributions of 
the individual independent variables. The decomposition technique involves one-to-one 
matching of cases between the two groups (female and male). Because the groups have 
different sizes, a sample is drawn and the process is repeated a 100 times reporting the mean 
results. The biggest effect explaining the financial access gap is driven by size differences 
between male and female owned business which account for more than a quarter of the gap. 
Other variables explaining the gap are age, export status and foreign ownership, together 
these explain close to 7 percent of the gap as female owned businesses tend to be younger, 
less likely to be engaged in export activities and have foreign participation. Finally, an 
interesting result, even if statistically weak, is that about sole proprietorship which goes into 
the opposite direction.  
    
So far, we have focused on gender differences in the use of formal finance.  Firms using 
little or no formal finance, however, might or might not have access to these financing 
sources. We can capture such differences by exploiting survey questions that relate to reasons 
for not applying or to rejections in loan applications.  In unreported regressions, we therefore 
also analyze whether there are gender differences across financially constrained enterprises 
that did not apply but indicated that they needed a loan and compare to enterprises that did 
not apply because they did not need a loan. Similarly, we focus on enterprises that applied for 
a loan and evaluate whether there are gender differences in the likelihood of being rejected. 
  18
   
 
We cannot find any gender differences in either specification, suggesting that, once we 
control for key firm’s characteristics, there are no gender differences in access to external 
bank finance, either through discouragement or rejection. In additional regressions, we also 
find that firms without female participation are less likely to state that they did not apply to a 
loan because they “would not be accepted”.  
The result that companies with female ownership participation, conditional on controlling 
for various key firm characteristics, do not tend to be disadvantaged in the use of formal 
finance seems at first rather surprising, especially considering the strong gender bias reported 
in Figure 1. However, as discussed this is not inconsistent with our results as we confirmed 
the existence of an unconditional gender gap. Furthermore, we show that a first mechanism 
driving the results is related to the fact that firms with female ownership participation tend to 
have specific characteristics that explain the unconditional gap (i.e. size, sector, foreign 
participation, export status, age). Additionally, another possible reason for lack of conditional 
gender discrimination may be the existence of a selection bias. Such a selection bias would 
imply that females are discriminated against, de facto or de jure, in a first stage when trying 
to establish and run a formal company in the first place, so that female entrepreneurs must be 
particularly capable or, in other words, must have characteristics that set them apart from 
male entrepreneurs owning companies with similar characteristics. While enterprise surveys 
do not allow detecting direct evidence for such a selection bias, Gajigo and Hallward-
Driemeier (2010) find suggestive evidence in four African countries that there are gender 
differences in capital in the start up phase. Although differences are higher across sectors 
than across gender, the median capital for male entrepreneurs is more than twice that than of 
female entrepreneurs. This signals that female entrepreneurs may face larger entry barriers 
than their male counterparts, but that once they enter, they do not face larger constraints.  
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In order to evaluate this possible selection mechanism through various steps, we 
assess the possibility of such a bias in three ways. First, we look at the sample composition 
and evaluate to what extent enterprises with female ownership participation are more or less 
likely to be informal, sole proprietors or innovators and have smaller or larger enterprises 
than enterprises without female owners. For this purpose, Table 6 shows the share of female 
and male entrepreneurs across different firm types. While 82 percent of our sample is formal, 
we find that in the case of firms with female ownership participation the share of formal firms 
is lower (78 percent). The share of sole proprietorships compared with other types of firms is 
high in our sample (52 percent) but is only 46 percent for firms with female ownership 
participation. 22 percent of firms with female ownership participation are micro-enterprises, 
while only 18 percent of firms with male ownership participation. This unconditional 
distribution of firms seems to indicate that female participation in our sample is typically in 
informal and smaller firms and with other owners ---women are less likely to be sole 
proprietors.  Obviously, this is very suggestive evidence that cannot be interpreted in a causal 
way, as financing constraints also determine firm growth and thus size.  
Second, we test whether, other things equal, certain enterprise characteristics differ by 
gender ownership participation.  While we cannot test for gender differences in inherent 
characteristics, we can test for observable differences, such as tendency to innovate.  We 
therefore estimate the following regression (3) where the dependent variables are indicators of 
product innovation and process innovation. Specifically, these are dummy variables that 
indicate whether the firm has (i) introduced a new product over the past three years or (ii) has 
improved the production process over the past three years. Overall, as presented in Table 1, 
57% of the firms in our sample indicate that they have introduced a new product, while 50% 
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indicate that have improved their production process. These means are higher, however, for 
firms with female ownership participation than for firms without female owners.14 
 :"#$% = '( + '*+,-"#$% + 	23#% + 45$ + <"#$%;	 + 7"#$%    (3) 
where the variables are the same as in regressions (1) and (2). 
The results in Table 7a show that, on average, female enterprises are significantly more 
likely to undertake product innovation, but not process innovation.15 On average, firms with 
female ownership participation are five percent more likely to innovate than other firms, 
although, these results do not hold for sole proprietorships and in the case of process innovation 
the effect is no longer significant once firm characteristics are controlled for (column 6). It is 
important to interpret these findings with caution, as the sample for which we have information 
available on innovation is significantly smaller than our overall sample, both in terms of 
countries (20) and in the number of firms within these countries.  In addition, there are concerns 
of endogeneity, as financing constraints might reduce the possibility to innovate. 
Finally, we test whether female entrepreneurs are more likely to be active in sectors 
with lower needs for external finance. Since the regressions in Tables 2 and 7a focus on intra-
industry variation (as they include industry fixed effects), they are not able to pick up such a 
selection bias.   We therefore run the following regression 
 +,-"#$% = '+=>?>@,$ + 	23# 	+ 7"#$%      (4) 
 
where – as above - Fem is a dummy variable indicating female ownership participation and 
Finance is the average of all firms in sector s across all sample countries for the following 
                                               
14 Refer to Table 1 for these descriptive statistics. 
15 As for previous probit regression we are displaying the marginal effects.  
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variables: (i) a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm has access to a formal financing 
channel (e.g. overdraft or loan), (ii) a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm has a 
bank account or credit line, (iii) the percentage of fixed asset investment financed by financial 
institutions, and (iv) the percentage of working capital financed by financial institutions. By 
using averages across countries, we are able to control for reverse causation to a certain extent.  
The coefficient b thus indicates whether enterprises with female ownership participation are 
more or less likely to operate in sectors that – on average – use more external finance. By 
including survey fixed effects, we control for country and year differences in access to external 
finance.  
The results, presented in Table 7b, do not provide any evidence that firms with female 
ownership participation are more likely to be in sectors characterized by lower use of finance. 
The female dummy enters negatively, but not significantly at the five percent level in any of 
the regressions.  
We interpret these results as, on the one hand, partially supporting our hypothesis of a 
selection bias among female entrepreneurs who have to be more capable than their male 
counterparts in order to be part of the formal enterprise universe –as it is shown by the 
innovation results in Table 7a. On the other hand, all other things equal, on average, businesses 
with female ownership participation are more likely to be smaller and therefore, for this reason, 
less likely to access formal external finance.  
 Concluding, this section shows that while African countries seem to be less equal 
towards female entrepreneurs shown by the existence of a gender gap in our unconditional 
regressions, once we control for key firm’s characteristics enterprises owned by females do not 
appear more financially constrained than those without female ownership participation. 
However, we find that larger businesses have systematically better access to external finance, 
and companies with female ownership participation tend to be smaller than their counterparts 
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owned purely by males. Going deeper into the mechanism, our results suggest that it is indeed 
size and industry the key characteristics behind the existence of the unconditional gender gap. 
Additional characteristics driving the unconditional gender gap are age, foreign ownership, 
export status and ownership type characterized female owned businesses. In addition, we 
provide some support towards the fact that this lack of difference in terms of accessing finance 
could be partially explained by the fact that the female entrepreneurs appear to be a “selected 
sample” with characteristics that may explain our findings. Females tend to be less likely to be 
owners of a formal company, and once they are able to break this “glass ceiling” it is because 
female entrepreneurs appear to be significantly more likely to innovate terms of new products. 
However, despite the possible biases due the existence of this selection effect our results are 
important in identifying that, for the sample of existing companies, we find that the existence 
of the unconditional gender gap is crucially driven by a set of key characteristics, size being 
the most important among them. The finding about the existence of an unconditional gender 
gap is for this reason consistent with the other finding that there is not a gender gap once we 
control for key firms characteristics such as size, industry, etc.     
 
3. Gender and Household Access to Financial Services 
This section explores gender differences in the use of different financial services by 
individuals.  Unlike in the previous section, we therefore focus more on savings and 
payments than credit services. We consider both formal and informal financial services.  This 
section first discusses the data and simple comparisons in the use of financial services by men 
and women, before turning to multivariate regressions.  
 
3.1. Data and Ocular Econometrics 
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To explore the relationship between gender and use of financial services, we use 
household surveys across nine Sub-Saharan African countries, co-branded as FinScope or 
FinAccess surveys. Specifically, we have data for Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, 
Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. These surveys, first undertaken in 
South Africa in 2002, are surveys with up to 7,600 observations and sampled with cluster 
stratified probability.  They are based on individuals rather than households.  While this 
might reduce the accuracy in terms of financial services that the individual has indirect access 
to through other household members and might reduce the representativeness, it has the 
advantage that we can focus specifically on the gender gap (Cull and Scott, 2010). For this 
study, we have a total of nine surveys available. While several countries have undertaken 
multiple surveys, we only include the most recent one available.  All surveys used in this 
section were undertaken between 2004 and 2009.  
The FinScope surveys distinguish between four different population segments – (i) 
users of formal banking services, (ii) users of other formal financial services, such as 
insurance companies, mobile phone services and regulated microfinance institutions, (iii) 
users informal financial services, including unregulated Savings and Credit Cooperative 
Organizations (SACCO), Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCA) and 
Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA), and (iv) individuals excluded from any 
service.  In the following, we will follow focus on (i) users of formal banking services, (ii) 
users of informal financial services (who could also use formal banking services) and (iii) 
individuals excluded from formal and informal services. In unreported robustness tests, we 
have also explored the gender gap among users of other formal financial services; for reasons 
of space, however, we do not focus on this segment.  
Figure 2 shows that, on average, women are less likely to use formal financial services 
than men, while gender differences in the use of informal financial services vary across 
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countries. Here, we graph the share of surveyed in each country that (i) uses formal banking 
services, (ii) uses informal services, and (iii) is excluded from any financial service, 
separately for men and women. All observations are weighted according to their 
representativeness. We also present standard t-tests for differences across the two groups.    
Panel A shows that women are less likely to use formal banking services across all 
nine countries, although the gender differences vary across countries. In Botswana, the 
gender gap is less than two percent and not significant, whereas in Kenya, the gender gap is 
11 percent, with 32 percent of men using formal banking services, but only 21 percent of 
women.  The Panel A graphs also show the large cross-country variation in use of formal 
banking services, documented elsewhere, with almost 70 percent of surveyed in South Africa 
using formal banking services, while only 17 percent using formal banking services in 
Zambia. 
The Panel B graphs show that the gender gap in the use of informal financial services 
varies across countries.  In Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania, women are more likely to use 
informal financial services than men, while the reverse holds in Namibia and Rwanda. The 
graphs also show the wide-spread variation in the use of informal services across the nine 
sample countries, ranging from 50 percent in Kenya to only one percent in Namibia.  
The Panel C graphs show that women are either as likely or more likely to be 
excluded from any financial service as men.  Specifically, in Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, they are more likely to be excluded from any financial 
service, while in the other countries there is no significant difference between men and 
women.   These graphs also indicate the high degree of financial exclusion across Southern 
and Eastern Africa, ranging from 80 percent in Zambia to 19 percent in South Africa.  
 These findings are consistent with the hypothesis of a gender gap in the use of formal 
banking services. They also give a first indication that this gender gap is not driven by lower 
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demand for formal financial services, as in several countries women are more likely to use 
informal financial services than men.  However, these comparisons do not control for other 
individual characteristics. Next, we will therefore turn to multi-variate regressions to explore 
whether these unconditional differences still hold once we control for other factors that can 
explain the use of formal and informal financial services. 
 
3.2. Multiavariate Results  
We next turn to multivariate regression analysis to explore whether the gender 
differences in the use of financial services hold when we control for other characteristics of 
individuals and households. Specifically, we use probit regressions of the following form: 																										!" = '( + '*+,-" + :"; + 7"                               (5) 
where y is access to financial services measured by the use of (i) formal banking services and 
(ii) informal financial services.  In addition, we use (iii) a dummy variable that indicates 
whether a person is financially excluded, i.e. uses neither formal nor informal financial 
services.  The regression is weighted and stratified on the rural-urban level.  The coefficient 
of interest is b, which indicates whether women are more or less likely to use financial 
services.   We run these regressions both country-by-country as well as a pooled version with 
country-fixed effects. While the results from the pooled regressions give us an indication of 
the average effect across countries, they do not allow for slope differences across countries.  
In addition to using country-specific weights, we weight by the inverse of the respective 
population in each country in the case of the pooled regression. As in the previous section, we 
report marginal effects in the Tables.  
We include a wide array of other individual characteristics that might explain 
variation in the use of financial services (see Appendix Table A2).  Appendix Table A3 
presents the descriptive statistics for all characteristics, for each country.  First, we control for 
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geographic location by including a dummy variable Rural indicating whether the individual 
lives in a rural district.  Geographic barriers such as larger distance to the nearest bank office 
would suggest a negative relationship between Rural and use of formal financial services, 
while the use of informal financial services might not necessarily vary across different 
geographic areas. We control for the education level of individuals, by including dummy 
variables that indicate whether the individual has (i) no education or less than primary, (ii) 
primary completed, (iii) secondary level completed, and (iv) at least an undergraduate college 
degree.  We expect individuals with higher levels of education to be more likely to use formal 
and informal financial services. We also include the Age of the individuals as well as its 
square.  While there might be a positive relationship between the age of individuals and the 
use of financial services, this relationship might be non-linear and turn negative at higher 
ages when individuals leave the labor market.  We also include an income measure where 
available. With the exception of Kenya (individual expenses), and Uganda (household 
income), we include the log of individual monthly income.16  We expect higher-income 
individuals to be more likely to be able to afford formal financial services, while the 
relationship of income with the use of informal financial services is not clear, a-priori. 
Finally, we include dummy variables indicating what the main income source of the 
individual is.  Specifically, Employed, and Self-employed are dummy variables indicating the 
employment status and sector, with the omitted category being dependent on pension or 
family. We also control for the ownership of a mobile phone, which might indicate stronger 
commercial needs and therefore demand for financial services.  It might also indicate, 
however, openness to new technologies and therefore bank delivery channels. Since the 
possession of a mobile phone might be endogenous to having a formal bank account, we run 
                                               
16 In the case of the pooled regression, we convert all income measures into USD, using average-year exchange 
rates. 
  27
   
 
the below regressions in unreported robustness tests without the mobile phone dummy and 
confirm all our findings.  
We control for the personal circumstances of the individual by including dummy 
variables for (i) being married, (ii) whether the survey respondent is head of household and – 
where available – (iii) whether the respondent is the main earner and decision taker.  All 
these factors might increase the probability of using financial services, be they formal or 
informal, as being married and/or being head of household imply stronger economic 
responsibilities.  
The results in Table 8 show that - on average – women are not significantly more or 
less likely to use formal financial services. We report first the pooled regression with country 
dummies and then nine country-specific regressions.  The pooled regression includes only 
variables that are available for all surveys.  The regression in column 1 of Table 8 shows an 
insignificant coefficient on the female dummy.  This is confirmed by considering the country-
level regressions.  Only in South Africa does the female dummy enter significantly and 
negatively, suggesting that females have a 11.8 percent lower probability of using formal 
financial services.  Unlike in the univariate comparisons of Figure 2, we therefore cannot find 
a gender gap in the use of formal banking services, once we control for other individual 
characteristics. 
 The use of formal banking services is correlated with an array of other individual 
factors. Individuals with higher income are more likely to use formal banking services, as are 
users of mobile phones. Even controlling for the fact that users of mobile phones have, on 
average, higher incomes, they are between 8.2 and 30.5 percent more likely to use formal 
banking services.  Formally and self-employed individuals are more likely to use formal 
banking services than non-employed. Perhaps surprisingly, the relationship between using 
formal banking services and rural residence is not consistent across countries. On the other 
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hand, education is a strong predictor of the use of banking services, with the use increasing 
linearly in most countries – with the notable exception of South Africa -, from individuals 
with primary education to individuals with secondary education to individuals with tertiary 
education. Older individuals are more likely to use formal banking services in almost all 
countries, although there is evidence for a non-linear effect, as the quadratic term enters 
negatively. We find that married individuals and household heads are more likely to use 
formal banking services, though these results are driven by a few countries.  
The country dummies in the pooled regression provide evidence for the cross-country 
variation in the use of financial services beyond differences in population composition. We 
find that relative to Botswana – the omitted country - all countries except for Namibia and 
South Africa have lower levels of formal banking use.  The differences range from 37 percent 
in Kenya to 14 percent in Zambia.  Individuals in Namibia and South Africa are as likely to 
use formal banking services as individuals in Botswana, controlling for the characteristics of 
individuals.   
 The results in Table 9 show that – on average across the nine surveys – women are 
more likely to use informal financial services. The effect is also economically large, with 
women being 5.8 percent more likely to use informal financial services than men. Looking 
behind the average effect across countries, we find that this is driven by Botswana, Kenya, 
and Tanzania, with the effect being especially strong in Kenya (14.7 percent).  On the other 
hand, there is no gender difference in the use of informal financial services in Malawi, 
Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia and even a negative relationship between being female 
and the likelihood of using informal finance in Rwanda.   
Many of the individual characteristics that explain the use of formal banking services 
also explain the use of informal financial services. It is important to note, however, that 
significant coefficients in the pooled regressions are often driven by a few countries. The 
  29
   
 
relationship between income and the use of informal financial services is positive in some but 
not all countries.  In some countries owners of mobile phones are more likely to use informal 
financial services while in others it does not make a difference or they are less likely. There 
are no consistent relationships between employment status, rural residence, education and use 
of informal financial services. The relationship between use of informal services and age is 
again non-linear, with the level entering positively and the square term entering negatively. 
Married individuals are more likely to use informal financial services in most, though not all, 
countries.  If individuals are the main earner in the household, they are more likely to use 
informal financial services in Tanzania, but less likely in Malawi.  The main decision maker 
is more likely to use informal financial services only in Kenya. The country dummies in the 
pooled regression suggest that individuals in all countries are less likely to use to informal 
financial services than individuals in Botswana.  
 Table 10 shows that, on average, women are less likely to be excluded from financial 
services, with significant cross-country variation behind the result from the pooled 
regression.  Specifically, women in Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, are less likely 
to be excluded from financial services (note that women in these same countries are more 
likely to use informal financial services), while women in Rwanda are more likely to be 
excluded.  There is no significant gender gap in financial exclusion in the other countries.  
 The other individual characteristics that are significantly correlated with the use of 
formal and informal financial services are also significantly correlated with the likelihood of 
being excluded, though with the opposite sign. As before, the pooled regression results are 
often driven by a few countries. Across all countries, higher income individuals are less likely 
to be excluded, and controlling for this income effect, owners of mobile phones are less likely 
to be excluded in most countries. Self-employed are less likely to be excluded in Kenya, 
Namibia, and Zambia while formally employed individuals are less likely to be excluded in 
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most countries. Rural residence does not consistently predict financial exclusion across 
countries. Education is an important predictor of the likelihood of not being excluded, with 
the relationship between the likelihood of exclusion and educational attainment decreasing in 
a linear measure in all countries, except for South Africa.  As before, the relationship between 
age and the likelihood of being financially excluded is non-linear, first decreasing then 
increasing. Married individuals are less likely to be excluded in most countries, while heads 
of household are no more or less likely to be excluded in most countries. The survey 
dummies in the pooled regression suggest that the probability of exclusion is higher in all 
countries compared to Botswana, with the exception of Rwanda and South Africa, for which 
the difference is insignificant. 
 In robustness tests, we re-ran the regressions in Tables 8, 9 and 10 without the 
household head dummy, given the high correlation with the female dummy (43%).  There are 
few differences. While the female dummy turns negative and significant in Uganda17, it turns 
positive and significant in Malawi. It continues to enter negatively and significantly in South 
Africa and insignificantly for all other countries and the pooled regression.  Excluding the 
household head variable from the regressions in Tables 9 and 10 does not yield any material 
difference in terms of coefficient size or significance. 
 In order to gain additional insights into the gender gap in the use of formal banking 
services, we explore gender differences in the reasons for not being banked, similar to the 
analysis in the previous sections on enterprises. Specifically, individuals without use of 
formal financial services were asked for the reason of being unbanked. We categorize these 
different reasons into three groups; first, demand-side reasons, including lack of regular 
income or job, insufficient money, illiteracy, and being too young or too old; second, supply-
side reasons, including decline of application, lack of identification documents or other 
                                               
17 This is consistent with findings by Johnson and Nino-Zarazua (2011) 
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qualifications, high minimum balances or fees, geographic distance and bad customer 
service; third, deliberate choice due to lack of need, lack of trust and preference for cash.18 In 
Table 11, we use the sample of individuals without formal financial services and use a 
multinomial regression model with dummy variables that take the value one if they state a 
reason categorized either as demand-side, supply-side or choice-related, on the female 
dummy as well as country-fixed effects. We find that females are more likely to state 
demand-side reasons and less likely to state supply-side or choice-related reasons for being 
unbanked than male respondents. This points to statistical rather than taste-based 
discrimination and disadvantages of females in other areas than access to finance.  
In order to understand which individual characteristics explain why women are less 
likely to use formal financial services, we use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, a standard 
tool for measuring contributions of endowments and coefficients in explaining gaps such as 
those between male and females (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973).  Since we have a non-linear 
model, we use the method suggested by Fairlie (2006) for the decomposition.  The regression 
results in Table 12 show that 78% of the variation in the use of formal financial services 
across gender groups can be explained by differences in individual characteristics rather than 
coefficients.  Education seems to be the strongest factor in explaining the different use of 
formal financial services, especially the lower share of females with secondary education. 
The lack of formal employment is another strong explanatory factor of why females are less 
likely to use formal financial services… 
 Overall, the results in Table 12 suggest that the fact that women have lower income, 
are less formally educated, are less likely to be head of household and are less likely to be 
formally employed across the countries in our sample explains why they are less likely to use 
formal banking services. This is consistent with the results in Table 11 that point to demand-
                                               
18 A similar classification for self-stated reasons of being unbanked has been used by Porteous (2007) 
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side constraints, including lack of income or formal job as main barriers to using formal 
banking services by females.  This suggests that it is not discrimination in the banking system 
or lower inherent demand by women that drives their lower use of banking services, but 
rather disadvantages in other areas.  However, these results also suggest that some of the 
findings might be driven by the survey methodology of interviewing individuals rather than 
households; women might have indirect access to formal financial services through their 
formally employed husbands that function as household heads.   
In sensitivity tests not shown19, we also explored whether the relationship between 
education, income, household head and married, on the one hand, and the use of financial 
services, on the other hand, varied between men and women. Few of the interaction terms, 
however, enter significantly, and mostly with differing signs across surveys.  Overall, there 
seems little evidence that education and marital status are differently related with use of 
financial services across genders. We also differentiated according to the financial service 
individuals are or are not using – credit, savings, insurance and transaction services.  Here we 
follow the definition by Porteous (2007) that captures both formal and semi-formal financial 
service providers. We find that females in Malawi and Tanzania (2006) are more likely to use 
transaction services, while there is no significant difference at the 5 percent level in other 
countries. Females in Botswana, Kenya and Zambia are more likely to use savings services, 
while they are less likely to use them in Rwanda. There are no significant gender differences 
in credit and insurance services.20  
 
4. Conclusions 
                                               
19 Results available upon request 
20 Results available upon request. 
  33
   
 
This paper assesses gender differences in the use of financial services by enterprises 
and households in Sub-Saharan Africa. While we find some evidence about the existence of 
an unconditional gender gap, once we control for firms and household characteristics we find 
no additional evidence of a conditional gender gap either for enterprises or individuals.  Once 
controlling for an array of characteristics such as size, industry, ownership type, foreign 
participation, export status and age, enterprises with female ownership participation in Sub-
Saharan Africa use as much external financing as enterprises without female ownership 
participation and female individuals are as likely to use formal financial services as male 
individuals. While this might seem surprising, our results suggest that one has to look beyond 
simple gender comparisons and explore the reasons why we find a lower financial market 
participation of women.  In the case of enterprises, key driver of the gender gap are exactly 
these key firm characterististics, especially size: female ownership participation tend to be of 
smaller size, and smaller firms have, on average, less access to external finance. Further, we 
provide some evidence of selection bias, i.e., female entrepreneurs have to overcome higher 
barriers in the first place, as evidenced by their higher tendency to innovate and higher legal 
burden in African countries compared to their male peers. Finally, we find some limited 
support for the hypothesis of a “sectoral selection” as female ownership tend to be more 
prevalent in sectors thattend to rely less on access to external finance.  In the case of 
individuals, univariate comparisons show a lower formal financial sector participation rate of 
females as they score lower on many other dimensions related to the use of financial services, 
including income, education and formal employment, but also personal life factors such as 
not being head of household. These barriers that women face as individuals to access formal 
financial services might also explain the selection bias among female entrepreneurs that we 
found in the first part of the paper. This is also consistent with gender differences in self-
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reported reasons for being unbanked, with females more likely than males quoting personal 
circumstances such as lack of formal income or job. 
Are African women disadvantaged in access to financial services?  Yes, but the 
reasons seem to lay mainly outside the financial sector, they lie in other dimensions related to 
female participation in the modern market economy. As discussed by World Bank (2011), 
women are disadvantaged among many dimensions, including participation in the labor force 
and education, which has repercussions for their participation in the modern market economy, 
including the formal financial sector.  Policies to expand access to financial services by 
women have to address these other dimensions if women are to reap the benefit of financial 
services as much as men.  By the same token, however, these results suggest the need for 
more innovative ways for banks to reach out to female customers that do not qualify for 
formal banking services based on traditional characteristics. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics Enterprise Surveys (Formal)
Variable Variable description Obs Mean
Mean 
(male)
Mean 
(female) sd Min Max
Loan_overdraft 1 if loan or overdraft 11382 0.31 0.32 0.29 0.46 0 1
Bankacc_creditln 1 if checking/saving account or credit line 11440 0.77 0.76 0.79 0.42 0 1
Fin_inv % Investments financed by formal institutions 5228 7.56 6.79 10.22 23.8 0 100
Fin_wkcap % Working capital financed by formal institutions 11363 3.78 3.55 4.55 13.2 0 100
Fininv_inf % Investments financed informally 2019 4.8 4.24 6.45 17.4 0 100
Finwkc_inf % Working capital financed informally 3729 4.09 4.09 4.10 13.5 0 100
Female At least 1 principal owner is female 11445 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.42 0 1
Female_mng Manager is female 2428 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.33 0 1
logEmployment Number of permanent workers -log 11445 2.72 2.76 2.59 1.28 0 11
Informal 1 if informal enterprise 11445 0 0.00 0.00 0 0 0
Micro 1-5 employees 11445 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.39 0 1
Small 6-10 employees 11445 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.45 0 1
Medium 11-49 employees 11445 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.48 0 1
Large 50 or more employees 11445 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.38 0 1
Private Private, limited ownership 11431 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.47 0 1
Sole_Proprietor Sole proprietor 11431 0.52 0.53 0.46 0.5 0 1
Partnership Partnership ownership 11431 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.32 0 1
Public Government ownership 11431 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.13 0 1
Other_ownership Other ownership 11431 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.14 0 1
Innov_prod Firm improved products in last 3yrs 3362 0.57 0.55 0.62 0.5 0 1
Innov_proc Firm improved production process in last 3yrs 3365 0.5 0.49 0.53 0.5 0 1
Exporter Firm exports directly at least 10% of total sales 11429 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.27 0 1
Foreign 10% or more owned by foreign 11431 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.37 0 1
lgCity In the capital city or population 1Mn or more 11445 0.20 0.2 0 0.4 0 1
Age Age of firm 11270 13.69 13.99 12.73 13.3 0 190
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Table 2: Gender Gap in Access to Finance - Formal Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All Formal Sole Proprietor Female Manager
Female -0.014 -0.006 0.008 -0.020 -0.017 -0.007
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]* [0.011] [0.011]
Female_mng -0.148 -0.136 -0.077
[0.031]*** [0.031]*** [0.033]**
Survey fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fe no yes no no yes no no yes no
Employment control no no yes no no yes no no yes
Observations 11400 11400 11382 5863 5863 5854 2428 2428 2414
pseudo_r2 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.06 0.06 0.07
Dprobit regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3: Explaining Access to Finance: Formal Enterprises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependant Variable: 
Loan or overdraft All Formal Informal
Female 0.016 0.010 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.005
[0.011] [0.011] [0.029] [0.029] [0.024] [0.024]
logEmployment 0.122 0.107 0.107 0.095 0.080 0.072
[0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]***
Fem_logEmp -0.001 0.001 0.010 0.012
[0.009] [0.009] [0.023] [0.024]
Private 0.018 0.018 0.022
[0.035] [0.035] [0.036]
Sole Proprietor -0.095 -0.095 -0.081
[0.035]*** [0.035]*** [0.036]**
Partnership -0.044 -0.044 -0.038
[0.034] [0.034] [0.034]
Other Ownership 0.038 0.038 0.033
[0.048] [0.048] [0.048]
logAge 0.018 0.025
[0.006]*** [0.008]***
Exporter 0.078
[0.020]***
Foreign 0.029
[0.014]**
lgCity -0.033 -0.031
[0.023] [0.022]
industry fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
survey fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo-Rsq 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.16 0.17
Observations 11382 11369 11369 11170 2406 2384
Dprobit regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: omitted variable public owned
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Table 4: Explaining Access to Finance - Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependant Variable: 
Loan or overdraft Formal-Sole Proprietors Informal-Sole Proprietor Female Manager
Female -0.007 -0.007 0.005 0.003
[0.030] [0.030] [0.026] [0.026]
Fem_logEmp 0.002 0.003 0.012 0.014
[0.013] [0.013] [0.026] [0.026]
Female_mng 0.041 0.033
[0.085] [0.086]
Femmng_logEmp -0.035 -0.029
[0.029] [0.030]
logEmployment 0.069 0.061 0.068 0.062 0.120 0.107
[0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]***
Private -0.010 -0.001
[0.059] [0.060]
Sole Proprietor -0.155 -0.130
[0.057]*** [0.059]**
Partnership -0.056 -0.051
[0.062] [0.064]
Other Ownership 0.043 0.039
[0.068] [0.069]
Exporter 0.080 0.047
[0.033]** [0.043]
Foreign 0.008 0.079
[0.019] [0.030]***
lgCity -0.053 -0.035 0.081
[0.017]*** [0.025] [0.055]
logAge 0.017 0.019 0.017
[0.006]*** [0.009]** [0.014]
industry fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
survey fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5854 5774 1954 1938 2402 2311
Pseudo-Rsq 0.26 0.27 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.15
Dprobit regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: omitted variable public owned
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Table 5: Non-Linear Decompositions of Female/Male Gaps in Use of Loan or Overdraft
All Formal Sole Proprietor
Number of obs 11170 6656
N of obs Male 8503 5199
N of obs Female 2667 1457
Male Loan/Overdraft Use Rate 0.314 0.180
Female Loan/Overdraft Use Rate 0.289 0.141
Male/Female Gap 0.025 0.039
Total explained 0.036 0.041
Contributions from gender differences in:
logEmployment 0.010   0.008
[0.001]***   [0.001]***
27.97%   19.66%
Private -0.001   
[0.002]   
-2.80%   
Sole_Proprietor -0.006   
[0.003]*   
-16.78%   
Partnership 0.001   
[0.002]   
2.80%   
Other_ownership 0.000   
[0.000]   
0.15%   
logAge 0.001   0.000
[0.000]**   [0.000]
2.80% 0.00%
Exporter 0.000 0.000
[0.000]*** [0.000]
1.36% 0.00%
Foreign 0.001 0.000
[0.000]** [0.000]
2.80% 0.00%
lgCity -0.001 0.000
[0.001]   [0.000]  
-2.80% 0.00%
Standard errors are reported in brackets below contribution estimates.
Contribution estimates are mean values of the decomposition.
Number of replications performed in decompositions is 100.
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Table 6. Distibution of Companies by Gender
Male Female Total
Formal n.obs. 8,742 2,703 11,445
% 83.07 77.67 81.73
Informal n.obs. 1,782 777 2,559
% 16.93 22.33 18.27
Total n.obs. 10,524 3,480 14,004
% 100 100 100
public obs 163 33 196
% 1.87 1.22 1.71
private, limited obs 2,792 976 3,768
% 31.98 36.13 32.96
sole proprietor obs 4,642 1,247 5,889
% 53.17 46.17 51.52
partnership obs 939 397 1,336
% 10.76 14.7 11.69
other obs 194 48 242
% 2.22 1.78 2.12
Total n.obs. 8,730 2,701 11,431
% 100 100 100
Micro 1-5 n.obs. 1,561 582 2,143
% 17.86 21.53 18.72
Small 6-10 n.obs. 2,474 792 3,266
% 28.3 29.3 28.54
Medium 11-49 n.obs. 3,086 947 4,033
% 35.3 35.04 35.24
Large 50+ n.obs. 1,621 382 2,003
% 18.54 14.13 17.5
Total 8,742 2,703 11,445
% 100 100 100
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Table 7a: Characteristics of Formal Enterprises 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable Product Innovation Proccess Innovation
Sample All Sole Proprietors All Sole Proprietors
Female 0.051 0.047 0.018 0.015 0.037 0.034 -0.039 -0.039
[0.022]** [0.022]** [0.034] [0.034] [0.022]* [0.023] [0.034] [0.034]
logEmployment 0.082 0.082 0.084 0.072 0.091 0.104 0.097 0.104
[0.009]***[0.010]***[0.016]***[0.017]***[0.010]***[0.010]***[0.017]***[0.017]***
Private 0.030 0.034 0.109 0.039
[0.109] [0.111] [0.115] [0.112]
Sole Proprietor 0.002 -0.001 0.062 -0.018
[0.111] [0.113] [0.117] [0.114]
Partnership 0.055 0.050 0.064 -0.013
[0.110] [0.112] [0.118] [0.116]
Other Ownership -0.122 -0.118 -0.074 -0.149
[0.151] [0.153] [0.158] [0.145]
logAge -0.016 -0.013 -0.028 -0.028
[0.012] [0.018] [0.012]** [0.017]
lgCity 0.071 0.089 0.035 0.029
[0.028]** [0.036]** [0.030] [0.037]
Exporter -0.008 0.098 -0.035 0.004
[0.034] [0.077] [0.034] [0.085]
Foreign 0.007 -0.001 -0.016 -0.087
[0.029] [0.075] [0.030] [0.073]
industry fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
survey fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3361 3315 1740 1716 3362 3316 1743 1719
Pseudo-Rsq 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07
Dprobit Regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: omitted variable public owned
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Table 7b: Industry Specific Access to Finance of Female Formal Enterprises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var.: Female All Formal
Sole 
Proprietor All Formal
Sole 
Proprietor All Formal
Sole 
Proprietor All Formal
Sole 
Proprietor
Loan_overdraft_s -0.235 -0.457
[0.163] [0.276]*
Bankacc_creditln_s -0.063 -0.153
[0.250] [0.434]
Fin_inv_s -0.004 -0.006
[0.006] [0.009]
Fin_wkcap_s -0.008 -0.008
[0.011] [0.018]
survey fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 11465 5898 11465 5898 11465 5898 11465 5898
Pseudo-Rsq 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05
Dprobit regressions. Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: se clustered at the industry level
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Table 8. Use of Banking Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sample ALL Bostwana Kenya Malawi Namibia Rwanda S.Africa Tanzania Uganda Zambia
Female 0.017 0.027 -0.018 0.024 -0.019 -0.008 -0.118 -0.002 -0.029 0.005
[0.019] [0.041] [0.030] [0.018] [0.040] [0.018] [0.050]** [0.008] [0.025] [0.006]
Rural 0.015 0.175 -0.071 -0.057 -0.048 -0.011 -0.057 -0.002 -0.016 0.010
[0.023] [0.084]**[0.029]**[0.022]*** [0.050] [0.021] [0.038] [0.009] [0.029] [0.007]
Primary 0.194 0.246 0.148 -0.013 0.079 0.109 0.216 0.027 0.084 0.014
[0.027]***[0.062]***[0.034]*** [0.018] [0.069] [0.021]***[0.059]***[0.010]***[0.027]*** [0.010]
Secondary 0.444 0.367 0.335 0.146 0.211 0.369 0.324 0.182 0.294 0.200
[0.027]***[0.067]***[0.040]***[0.032]***[0.073]***[0.092]***[0.056]***[0.038]***[0.065]***[0.032]***
Tertiary 0.656 0.520 0.564 0.618 0.801 0.256 0.696 0.439 0.679
[0.023]***[0.080]***[0.069]***[0.102]*** [0.085]***[0.028]***[0.099]***[0.162]***[0.152]***
Age 0.120 0.124 0.139 0.077 0.161 0.111 0.065 0.003 0.048
[0.032]*** [0.079] [0.043]***[0.025]***[0.077]**[0.032]*** [0.079] [0.011] [0.015]***
Age_sq -0.006 -0.009 -0.010 -0.007 -0.017 -0.011 0.001 0.001 -0.004
[0.003]* [0.008] [0.004]**[0.003]***[0.009]*[0.003]*** [0.008] [0.001] [0.002]**
Employed 0.409 0.109 0.125 0.127 0.342 0.020 0.166 0.103 -0.001 0.229
[0.020]***[0.058]*[0.039]***[0.034]***[0.054]*** [0.037] [0.056]***[0.036]*** [0.040] [0.034]***
Self_employed 0.242 -0.022 0.070 -0.007 0.158 0.051 -0.009 -0.048 0.085
[0.028]*** [0.071] [0.040]* [0.026] [0.066]** [0.087] [0.010] [0.033] [0.023]***
Married 0.108 0.125 -0.041 -0.026 0.140 0.018 -0.025 0.010 0.001 0.017
[0.021]***[0.064]** [0.030] [0.020] [0.052]*** [0.020] [0.053] [0.008] [0.023] [0.006]***
HH_head 0.090 -0.012 0.025 -0.010 0.041 -0.021 0.003 0.050 0.002
[0.022]*** [0.061] [0.036] [0.020] [0.050] [0.057] [0.009] [0.024]** [0.011]
Owns_mobile 0.313 0.197 0.295 0.181 0.305 0.117 0.124 0.287 0.082
[0.021]***[0.044]***[0.024]***[0.020]***[0.046]*** [0.056]**[0.018]***[0.032]***[0.018]***
Earner 0.114 0.009 0.027 -0.019 0.016
[0.058]* [0.032] [0.046] [0.020] [0.011]
Income_log 0.077 0.145 0.036 0.050 0.036 0.026 0.010 0.034
[0.010]***[0.017]***[0.005]***[0.009]***[0.014]***[0.008]***[0.003]***[0.008]***
Decision_mkr 0.110 0.025 0.049 -0.003
[0.033]*** [0.019] [0.027]* [0.007]
Kenya -0.372
[0.038]***
Malawi -0.242
[0.027]***
Namibia 0.031
[0.092]
Rwanda -0.192
[0.043]***
SouthAfrica 0.075
[0.074]
Tanzania -0.304
[0.020]***
Uganda -0.245
[0.030]***
Zambia -0.142
[0.055]**
local regional fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 33872 974 6589 4712 1065 1894 3345 5864 1674 3990
Pseudo-Rsq 0.43 0.37 0.46 0.36 0.47 0.32 0.27 0.40 0.41 0.53
Dprobit regressions. Omitted Botswana. Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 9. Use of Informal Services
(1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
ALL Bostwana Kenya Malawi Namibia Rwanda S.Africa Tanzania Uganda Zambia
Female 0.058 0.105 0.147 -0.013 -0.000 -0.086 0.011 0.063 0.041 -0.000
[0.010]***[0.034]***[0.029]*** [0.018] [0.000] [0.032]*** [0.011] [0.019]*** [0.029] [0.002]
Rural 0.010 -0.066 -0.004 0.191 0.000 0.006 0.039 -0.051 0.009 -0.002
[0.014] [0.065] [0.031] [0.017]*** [0.001] [0.040] [0.015]***[0.025]** [0.035] [0.003]
Primary 0.029 0.167 0.067 -0.009 -0.001 -0.060 -0.012 0.073 0.032 -0.003
[0.013]**[0.050]***[0.030]** [0.017] [0.001] [0.031]* [0.012] [0.021]*** [0.026] [0.002]
Secondary 0.032 0.173 -0.047 -0.048 -0.001 -0.200 -0.035 -0.005 -0.003 -0.009
[0.015]**[0.062]*** [0.038] [0.025]* [0.001] [0.041]***[0.013]*** [0.037] [0.048] [0.003]***
Tertiary 0.078 0.257 -0.226 -0.139 -0.000 -0.030 -0.194 0.241 -0.006
[0.035]** [0.106]**[0.065]***[0.037]*** [0.000] [0.005]***[0.028]*** [0.151] [0.002]***
Age 0.099 0.320 0.138 0.010 -0.001 -0.030 0.021 -0.035 0.003
[0.017]***[0.065]***[0.040]*** [0.024] [0.001] [0.049] [0.012]* [0.033] [0.004]
Age_sq -0.009 -0.026 -0.016 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.000
[0.002]***[0.007]***[0.004]*** [0.003] [0.000] [0.005] [0.001]* [0.004] [0.000]
Employed 0.150 0.199 0.111 -0.022 0.000 -0.098 0.011 -0.098 -0.097 0.041
[0.016]***[0.053]***[0.035]*** [0.027] [0.000] [0.044]** [0.014] [0.044]** [0.047]**[0.015]***
Self_employed 0.080 0.027 0.108 -0.007 -0.017 0.052 -0.068 0.016
[0.019]*** [0.066] [0.035]*** [0.025] [0.006]*** [0.035] [0.048] [0.007]**
Married 0.069 0.092 0.032 -0.024 0.007 -0.025 -0.018 0.024 0.071 0.004
[0.012]*** [0.050]* [0.028] [0.018] [0.008] [0.031] [0.007]** [0.020] [0.025]*** [0.002]*
HH_head 0.026 -0.047 -0.007 -0.026 0.000 -0.010 0.003 0.044 -0.009
[0.012]** [0.047] [0.034] [0.020] [0.000] [0.013] [0.019] [0.030] [0.004]**
Owns_mobile 0.052 0.137 0.064 -0.023 0.000 -0.018 -0.004 0.056 -0.006
[0.012]***[0.038]***[0.027]** [0.018] [0.000] [0.010]* [0.022] [0.029]* [0.003]**
Earner 0.082 -0.069 0.098 0.001
[0.049]* [0.037]* [0.028]*** [0.003]
Income_log 0.026 0.026 0.006 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.006 0.011
[0.009]***[0.013]** [0.003]** [0.000] [0.010] [0.001] [0.004]* [0.008]
Decision_mkr 0.099 -0.034 -0.015 -0.002
[0.030]*** [0.021] [0.037] [0.019]
Kenya -0.104
[0.018]***
Malawi -0.085
[0.008]***
Namibia -0.157
[0.021]***
Rwanda -0.087
[0.009]***
SouthAfrica -0.102
[0.007]***
Tanzania -0.068
[0.014]***
Uganda -0.069
[0.012]***
Zambia -0.117
[0.019]***
local regional fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 33173 974 6589 4712 228 1869 3345 5864 1674 3990
Pseudo-Rsq 0.33 0.29 0.10 0.07 0.33 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.08 0.25
Dprobit regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Omitted Botswana
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Table 10. Excluded from Financial Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
ALL Bostwana Kenya Malawi Namibia Rwanda SouthAfricaTanzania Uganda Zambia
Female -0.068 -0.127 -0.076 0.017 0.019 0.090 0.055 -0.076 -0.067 -0.004
[0.020]***[0.040]***[0.021]*** [0.025] [0.040] [0.035]*** [0.032]* [0.023]*** [0.037]* [0.011]
Rural -0.010 -0.070 0.039 -0.157 0.035 0.018 -0.009 0.074 0.017 -0.006
[0.025] [0.078] [0.023]* [0.028]*** [0.051] [0.046] [0.023] [0.030]** [0.047] [0.013]
Primary -0.163 -0.241 -0.068 0.033 -0.096 -0.075 -0.145 -0.118 -0.079 0.001
[0.025]***[0.052]***[0.018]*** [0.022] [0.069] [0.036]**[0.041]***[0.026]***[0.036]** [0.014]
Secondary -0.366 -0.300 -0.145 -0.138 -0.229 -0.175 -0.191 -0.251 -0.322 -0.164
[0.026]***[0.061]***[0.023]***[0.036]***[0.073]***[0.071]**[0.040]***[0.044]***[0.059]***[0.027]***
Tertiary -0.498 -0.400 -0.120 -0.468 -0.460 -0.137 -0.482 -0.397 -0.649
[0.019]***[0.037]***[0.037]***[0.040]*** [0.058]***[0.019]***[0.068]***[0.114]***[0.135]***
Age -0.159 -0.173 -0.099 -0.098 -0.182 -0.105 -0.071 0.008 -0.057
[0.031]*** [0.078]**[0.024]***[0.032]***[0.077]** [0.057]* [0.055] [0.038] [0.023]**
Age_sq 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.018 0.012 0.002 -0.001 0.005
[0.003]*** [0.008] [0.002]***[0.003]***[0.009]** [0.006]* [0.006] [0.004] [0.003]*
Employed -0.418 -0.186 -0.086 -0.102 -0.346 0.082 -0.146 -0.233 0.104 -0.308
[0.019]***[0.056]***[0.022]***[0.037]***[0.054]*** [0.063] [0.038]***[0.060]*** [0.071] [0.034]***
Self_employed -0.230 -0.003 -0.083 -0.012 -0.178 -0.020 -0.043 0.102 -0.111
[0.024]*** [0.073] [0.021]*** [0.033] [0.063]*** [0.055] [0.040] [0.064] [0.026]***
Married -0.174 -0.175 -0.051 0.051 -0.136 -0.076 0.038 -0.070 -0.078 -0.048
[0.020]***[0.053]***[0.020]** [0.025]**[0.052]***[0.035]** [0.041] [0.024]***[0.033]**[0.010]***
HH_head -0.080 -0.015 -0.012 0.051 -0.046 0.007 -0.017 -0.103 0.008
[0.022]*** [0.059] [0.024] [0.027]* [0.050] [0.038] [0.025] [0.036]*** [0.019]
Owns_mobile -0.298 -0.189 -0.211 -0.166 -0.303 -0.056 -0.221 -0.298 -0.088
[0.021]***[0.042]***[0.025]***[0.023]***[0.046]*** [0.040] [0.027]***[0.038]***[0.020]***
Earner -0.083 0.045 -0.023 -0.100 -0.026
[0.056] [0.042] [0.046] [0.041]** [0.018]
Income_log -0.052 -0.056 -0.026 -0.048 -0.066 -0.016 -0.025 -0.049
[0.009]***[0.009]***[0.004]***[0.009]***[0.017]***[0.005]***[0.005]***[0.012]***
Decision_mkr -0.021 -0.006 -0.013 0.014
[0.023] [0.027] [0.044] [0.023]
Kenya 0.403
[0.053]***
Malawi 0.323
[0.042]***
Namibia 0.302
[0.088]***
Rwanda 0.095
[0.068]
SouthAfrica 0.049
[0.080]
Tanzania 0.306
[0.054]***
Uganda 0.299
[0.050]***
Zambia 0.308
[0.059]***
local regional fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 33872 974 6589 4712 1065 1894 3345 5864 1674 3990
Psudo-Rsq 0.43 0.35 0.31 0.11 0.48 0.10 0.31 0.18 0.19 0.44
Dprobit regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Omitted Botswana
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Table 11: Reasons for not Banking
Demand Supply Choice
Female 0.072 -0.065 -0.115
[0.036]*  [0.038]  [0.043]** 
Kenya -0.508 1.745 1.673
[0.139]** [0.162]** [0.198]** 
Malawi -1.743 -0.055 -0.703
[0.131]** [0.155]  [0.196]** 
Namibia -0.915 -0.58 -0.469
[0.157]** [0.194]** [0.242]  
Rwanda 0.182 1.235 -0.309
[0.161]  [0.183]** [0.270]  
SouthAfrica -0.758 0.191 0.767
[0.148]** [0.173]  [0.208]** 
Tanzania 0.135 2.19 1.483
[0.144]  [0.166]** [0.202]** 
Uganda -2.056 -0.978 -0.316
[0.132]** [0.159]** [0.195]  
Zambia -0.151 0.159 0.312
[0.138]  [0.164]  [0.202]  
Constant 2.431 0.311 -0.299
[0.127]** [0.152]*  [0.190]  
 Number of obs   =      25754
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
 Wald chi2(27)   =    5838.91
Multinomial probit regression. Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Reasons Included in Supply : was declined, does not have ID, does not qualify, need to 
keep minimum balance, does not know how to open an account, does not want to pay 
fees, charges are too high, bank is too far,it takes too long to get money back, could 
not speak their language, they are rude, not for people like me, not confortable.
Reasons Included in Demand : don't have regular income or job; have little money; 
can't read; is too young or too old.
Reasons included in personal Choice : don't need a bank account, prefer dealing in 
cash, don't trust banks.
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Table 12: Non-Linear Decompositions of Female/Male Gaps in Use of Banking Rates
Number of obs 33883
N of obs Male 15740
N of obs Female 18143
Male Banking Use Rate 0.293
Female Banking Use Rate 0.225
Male/Female Gap 0.068
Total explained 0.078
Contributions from gender differences in:
Rural -0.001
[0.000]*** 
-1.29%
Primary -0.004
[0.000]*** 
-5.15%
Secondary 0.018
[0.001]*** 
23.16%
Tertiary 0.004
[0.000]*** 
5.15%
Age -0.002
[0.003]   
-2.57%
Age_sq 0.007
[0.003]**  
9.01%
Employed 0.014
[0.001]*** 
18.01%
Self_employed -0.001
[0.000]*** 
-1.29%
Married 0.001
[0.001]*** 
1.29%
Owns_mobile 0.008
[0.000]*** 
10.29%
HH_head 0.02
[0.003]*** 
25.73%
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis below contribution estimates.
Contribution estimates are mean values of the decomposition.
Number of replications performed in decompositions is 100.
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Table A1a. Enterprise Surveys Sample
country obs country obs
Angola2006 540 Liberia2009 150
Benin2009 150 Madagascar2009 558
Botswana2006 444 Malawi2005 160
Burkina Faso2006 139 Malawi2009 150
Burkina Faso2009 516 Mali2007 619
Burundi2006 407 Mauritania2006 361
Cameroon2006 172 Mauritius2009 484
Cameroon2009 483 Mozambique2007 599
Cape Verde2006 98 Namibia2006 429
Cape Verde2009 271 Niger2005 125
Chad2009 150 Niger2009 150
Congo, Dem. Rep.2006 444 Nigeria2007 2,387
Congo, Dem. Rep.2009 151 Rwanda2006 340
CÀ´te d'Ivoire2009 618 Senegal2007 625
Eritrea2009 179 Sierra Leone2009 150
Gabon2009 179 SouthAfrica2007 1,057
Gambia, The2006 301 Swaziland2006 429
Ghana2007 616 Tanzania2006 484
Guinea-Bissau2006 296 Togo2009 145
Guinea2006 327 Uganda2006 663
Kenya2007 781 Zambia2007 603
Lesotho2009 151 Total 18,081
Table A1b. Household Surveys Sample (Finscope)
country obs
Bostwana2004 1,200
Kenya2009 6,598
Malawi2008 4,993
Namibia2004 1,200
Rwanda2008 2,000
SouthAfrica2008 3,900
Tanzania2009 7,680
Uganda2006 2,959
Zambia2005 3,998
Total 34,528
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Table A2. Description Variables Household Surveys
Variable Variable description
Banking uses now banking services
Informal uses now unregistered financial services
Excluded not banked; not formal or informal financial institutions
Transactions able to deposit, withdraw, or transfer money
Savings has savings cc/oo any kind of institution
Credit has a cash loan from a formal institution
Insurance has any kind of short/long-term insurance (health, funeral, crops, house, life, car...)
Female 1 if respondent female
Age age respondent divided by 10
Age_sq age respondent divided by 10 and squared
Rural lives in a rural area
No-education less than primary
Primary primary complete (and) less than secondary complete
Secondary secondary or vocational training complete (and) less than tertiary complete
Tertiary tertiary complete or more
Employed (main) source of income is from a wage (company or individual)
Self_employed (main) source of income is from own business 
Married 1 if married
HH_head 1 if household head
Owns_mobile owns/uses pre-paid or contract cell phone
Income_log log individual monthly income -LCU (ALL in USD)
Earner 1 if household main earner
Decision_mkr makes financial decisions (self or with spouse)
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Table A3. Summary Statistics Household Surveys 
ALL Bostwana Kenya Malawi Namibia 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Banking 34528 0.25 0.43 0 1 1200 0.43 0.5 0 1 6598 0.25 0.44 0 1 4993 0.19 0.39 0 1 1200 0.53 0.5 0 1
Formal 34528 0.14 0.35 0 1 1200 0.49 0.5 0 1 6598 0.35 0.48 0 1 4993 0.17 0.37 0 1 1200 0.17 0.38 0 1
Informal 34528 0.25 0.43 0 1 1200 0.31 0.46 0 1 6598 0.5 0.5 0 1 4993 0.25 0.43 0 1 1200 0.01 0.08 0 1
Excluded 34528 0.5 0.5 0 1 1200 0.46 0.5 0 1 6598 0.32 0.47 0 1 4993 0.55 0.5 0 1 1200 0.46 0.5 0 1
Female 34528 0.54 0.5 0 1 1200 0.51 0.5 0 1 6598 0.59 0.49 0 1 4993 0.52 0.5 0 1 1200 0.5 0.5 0 1
Rural 34528 0.68 0.47 0 1 1200 0.67 0.47 0 1 6598 0.71 0.45 0 1 4993 0.81 0.39 0 1 1200 0.55 0.5 0 1
Primary 34040 0.48 0.5 0 1 1200 0.36 0.48 0 1 6598 0.32 0.46 0 1 4993 0.55 0.5 0 1 1200 0.44 0.5 0 1
Secondary 34040 0.19 0.39 0 1 1200 0.32 0.47 0 1 6598 0.23 0.42 0 1 4993 0.13 0.34 0 1 1200 0.4 0.49 0 1
Tertiary 34040 0.03 0.16 0 1 1200 0.06 0.23 0 1 6598 0.02 0.14 0 1 4993 0.02 0.15 0 1 1200 0.03 0.16 0 1
Age 34359 3.625 1.531 1.6 10.5 1200 3.509 1.515 1.8 8.7 6597 3.87 1.671 1.6 10.5 4993 3.645 1.572 1.8 9.8 1198 3.374 1.344 1.6 8.8
Age_sq 34359 15.49 13.85 2.56 110 1200 146.04 135.17 32.4 757 6597 177.73 157.45 25.6 1103 4993 157.59 149.07 32.4 960.4 1198 131.88 114.78 25.6 774
Employed 34528 0.18 0.39 0 1 1200 0.37 0.48 0 1 6598 0.22 0.42 0 1 4993 0.15 0.36 0 1 1200 0.4 0.49 0 1
Self_employed 34528 0.16 0.37 0 1 1200 0.1 0.29 0 1 6598 0.2 0.4 0 1 4993 0.15 0.35 0 1 1200 0.11 0.31 0 1
Married 34525 0.58 0.49 0 1 1197 0.21 0.4 0 1 6598 0.6 0.49 0 1 4993 0.74 0.44 0 1 1200 0.25 0.43 0 1
HH_head 34517 0.49 0.5 0 1 1199 0.41 0.49 0 1 6598 0.49 0.5 0 1 4993 0.5 0.5 0 1 1200 0.38 0.48 0 1
Owns_mobile 34528 0.36 0.48 0 1 1200 0.38 0.48 0 1 6598 0.47 0.5 0 1 4993 0.33 0.47 0 1 1200 0.37 0.48 0 1
Income_log 29680 3.02 3.36 -9.1 12.11 1023 3.16 3.44 -2.24 8.58 6590 4.66 1.09 -1.24 9.37 4737 2.9 2.82 -5.638 9.28 1091 2.77 3.71 -2.56 8.95
Earner 21000 0.71 0.46 0 1 1154 0.4 0.49 0 1 0 4968 0.95 0.23 0 1 1200 0.24 0.43 0 1
Decision_mkr 21271 0.74 0.44 0 1 0 6598 0.73 0.44 0 1 4993 0.8 0.4 0 1 0
Rwanda SouthAfrica Tanzania Uganda Zambia 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max n. obs. mean st.dev. min max
Banking 2000 0.14 0.35 0 1 3900 0.7 0.46 0 1 7680 0.11 0.32 0 1 2959 0.16 0.37 0 1 3998 0.14 0.35 0 1
Formal 2000 0.07 0.25 0 1 3900 0.03 0.16 0 1 7680 0.05 0.22 0 1 2959 0.07 0.26 0 1 3998 0.01 0.11 0 1
Informal 2000 0.26 0.44 0 1 3900 0.08 0.28 0 1 7680 0.27 0.44 0 1 2959 0.21 0.41 0 1 3998 0.03 0.17 0 1
Excluded 2000 0.53 0.5 0 1 3900 0.19 0.39 0 1 7680 0.57 0.49 0 1 2959 0.62 0.48 0 1 3998 0.83 0.38 0 1
Female 2000 0.64 0.48 0 1 3900 0.5 0.5 0 1 7680 0.53 0.5 0 1 2959 0.52 0.5 0 1 3998 0.5 0.5 0 1
Rural 2000 0.75 0.44 0 1 3900 0.24 0.43 0 1 7680 0.77 0.42 0 1 2959 0.71 0.45 0 1 3998 0.68 0.47 0 1
Primary 2000 0.5 0.5 0 1 3900 0.46 0.5 0 1 7666 0.64 0.48 0 1 2485 0.43 0.5 0 1 3998 0.47 0.5 0 1
Secondary 2000 0.06 0.24 0 1 3900 0.37 0.48 0 1 7666 0.09 0.28 0 1 2485 0.11 0.31 0 1 3998 0.26 0.44 0 1
Tertiary 2000 0.01 0.12 0 1 3900 0.11 0.31 0 1 7666 0.01 0.08 0 1 2485 0.02 0.13 0 1 3998 0.01 0.11 0 1
Age 2000 3.787 1.575 1.8 9.1 3900 3.8 1.6 1.6 9.9 7680 3.7 1.4 1.6 9.9 2801 3.5 1.5 1.8 9.5 3990 3.0 1.2 1.6 8.9
Age_sq 2000 168.2 145.5 32.4 828 3900 170.4 138.3 25.6 980.1 7680 154.2 127.3 25.6 980.1 2801 146.9 136.2 32.4 902.5 3990 108.2 99.8 25.6 792.1
Employed 2000 0.1 0.3 0 1 3900 0.37 0.48 0 1 7680 0.04 0.2 0 1 2959 0.15 0.35 0 1 3998 0.19 0.4 0 1
Self_employed 2000 0.11 0.31 0 1 3900 0.07 0.26 0 1 7680 0.18 0.38 0 1 2959 0.28 0.45 0 1 3998 0.17 0.38 0 1
Married 2000 0.55 0.5 0 1 3900 0.38 0.49 0 1 7680 0.73 0.44 0 1 2959 0.55 0.5 0 1 3998 0.51 0.5 0 1
HH_head 2000 0.51 0.5 0 1 3900 0.48 0.5 0 1 7672 0.54 0.5 0 1 2957 0.55 0.5 0 1 3998 0.42 0.49 0 1
Owns_mobile 2000 0.07 0.25 0 1 3900 0.73 0.44 0 1 7680 0.26 0.44 0 1 2959 0.28 0.45 0 1 3998 0.2 0.4 0 1
Income_log 1894 2.3 1.57 -7 8.61 3345 3.69 3.42 -2.8 8.93 5886 2.75 2.76 -7.88 7.04 1956 2.59 1.56 -2.397 12.11 3158 0.27 6.27 -9.1 7.76
Earner 2000 0.36 0.48 0 1 0 7680 0.89 0.31 0 1 0 3998 0.45 0.5 0 1
Decision_mkr 2000 0.77 0.42 0 1 0 7680 0.69 0.46 0 1 0 0
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Banking Informal Excluded
country Gap tstat Gap tstat Gap tstat
Bostwana -2 0.89 4 -1.31 -4 1.33
Kenya -11 10.99 13 -10.67 -2 1.17
Malawi -3 2.21 -1 0.89 4 -2.84
Namibia -7 2.48 -1 2.11 7 -2.48
Rwanda -5 2.6 -4 1.76 8 -3.77
SouthAfrica -4 3.06 3 -3.02 -1 0.4
Tanzania -4 5.3 3 -3.09 1 -1.06
Uganda -10 7.33 1 -0.16 8 -4.05
Zambia -6 5.37 0 -1.24 6 -4.83
ALL -7 17.31 6 -14.07 1 -2.23
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Figure 2. Gender Gap in the Use of Finacial Services
